Min-max saddle point games appear in a wide range of applications in machine leaning and signal processing. Despite their wide applicability, theoretical studies are mostly limited to the special convex-concave structure. While some recent works generalized these results to special smooth non-convex cases, our understanding of non-smooth scenarios is still limited. In this work, we study special form of non-smooth min-max games when the objective function is (strongly) convex with respect to one of the player's decision variable. We show that a simple multi-step proximal gradient descent-ascent algorithm converges to -first-order Nash equilibrium of the min-max game with the number of gradient evaluations being polynomial in 1/ . We will also show that our notion of stationarity is stronger than existing ones in the literature. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm through adversarial attack on a LASSO estimator.
or equivalently if
for all θ ∈ Θ and α ∈ A; and all M > 0.
This definition implies that, at the first-order Nash equilibrium point, each player satisfies the first-order necessary optimality condition of its own objective when the other player's strategy is fixed. This is also equivalent to saying we have found the solution to the corresponding variational inequality [31] . Moreover, in the unconstrained smooth case that Θ = R d θ , A = R dα , and p ≡ q ≡ 0, this definition reduces to the standard widely used definition ∇ α h(θ * , α * ) = 0 and ∇ θ h(θ * , α * ) = 0.
In practice, we use iterative methods for solving such games and it is natural to evaluate the performance of the algorithms based on their efficiency in finding an approximate-FNE point. To this end, let us define the concept of approximate-FNE point: In the unconstrained and smooth scenario that Θ = R d θ , A = R dα , and p ≡ q ≡ 0, the above -FNE definition reduces to ∇ α h(θ,ᾱ) ≤ and ∇ θ h(θ,ᾱ) ≤ .
Remark 1. The above definition of -FNE is stronger than the -stationarity concept defined based on the proximal gradient norm in the literature (see, e.g., [32] ). Details of this remark is discussed in the Appendix section.
Remark 2. (Rephrased from Proposition 4.2 in [33] ) For the min-max game (2) , under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, FNE always exists. Moreover, it is easy to show that X (·, ·) and Y(·, ·) are continuous functions in their arguments. Hence, -FNE exists for every ≥ 0.
In what follows, we consider two different scenarios for finding -FNE points. In the first scenario, we assume that h(θ, α) is strongly concave in α for every given θ and develop a first-order algorithm for finding -FNE. Then, in the second scenario, we extend our result to the case where h(θ, α) is concave (but not strongly concave) in α for every given θ.
Non-Convex Strongly-Concave Games
In this section, we study the zero-sum game (2) in the case that the function h(θ, α) is σ-strongly concave in α for every given value of θ. To understand the idea behind the algorithm, let us define the auxiliary function
A "conceptual" algorithm for solving the min-max optimization problem (2) is to minimize the function g(θ) + q(θ) using iterative decent procedures. First, notice that, based on the following lemma, the strong concavity assumption implies the differentiability of g(θ).
α for any given θ. Then, under Assumption 3, the function g(θ) is differentiable. Moreover, its gradient is L g -Lipschitz continuous, i.e.,
The smoothness of the function g(θ) suggests the natural multi-step proximal method in Algorithm 1 for solving the min-max optimization problem (2) . This algorithm performs two major steps in each iteration: the first major step, which is marked as "Accelerated Proximal Gradient Ascent", runs multiple iterations of the accelerated proximal gradient ascent to estimate the solution of the inner maximization problem. In other words, this step finds a point α t+1 such that
The output of this step will then be used to compute the approximate proximal gradient of the function g(θ) in the second step based on the classical Danskin's theorem [34, 35] , which is restated below:
Theorem 1 (Rephrased from [34, 35] ). Let V ⊂ R m be a compact set and J(u, ν) : R n × V → R be differentiable with respect to u. LetJ(u) = max ν∈V J(u, ν) and assumeV (u) = {ν ∈ V | J(u, ν) = J(u)} is singleton for any given u. Then,J(u) is differentiable and ∇ uJ (u) = ∇ u J(u,ν) witĥ ν ∈V (u).
According to the above lemma, the proximal gradient descent update rule on g(θ) will be given by
The two main proximal gradient update operators used in Algorithm 1 are defines as
and
The following theorem establishes the rate of convergence of Algorithm 1 to -FNE. A more detailed statement of the theorem (which includes the constants of the theorem) is presented in the Appendix section.
Theorem 2. [Informal Statement] Consider the min-max zero-sum game
where function h(θ, α) is σ−strongly concave in α for any given θ. In Algorithm 1, if we choose
and K and T large enough such that
then there exists an iterate t ∈ {0, · · · , T − 1} such that (θ t , α t+1 ) is an -FNE of (2).
for k = 0, · · · , K/N do 4: Set β 1 = 1 and x 0 = α t 5:
if k = 0 then for j = 1, 2, . . . , N do 11: Set x j = ρ α (θ t , y j , η 1 )
12:
Set β j+1 = 1 + 1 + 4β 2 j 2 13:
end for 15: end for 16 :
Proximal Gradient Ascent [27, 36] Corollary 1. Based on Theorem 1, to find an -FNE of the game (2), Algorithm 1 requires O( −2 log( −1 )) gradients evaluations of the objective function.
Non-Convex Concave Games
In this section, we consider the min-max problem (2) under the assumption that h(θ, α) is concave (but not strongly concave) in α for any given value of θ. In this case, the direct extension of Algorithm 1 will not work since the function g(θ) might be non-differentiable. To overcome this issue, we start by making the function f (θ, α) strongly concave by adding a "negligible" regularization. More specifically, we define
for someα ∈ A. We then apply Algorithm 1 to the modified non-convex-strongly-concave game
It can be shown that by choosing λ = 2 √ 2R , when we apply Algorithm 1 to the modified game (4), we obtain an -FNE of the original problem (2). More specifically, with a proper choice of parameters, the following theorem establishes that the proposed method converges to -FNE point of the original problem. 
Numerical Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm for the problem of attacking the LASSO estimator. In other words, our goal is to find a small perturbation of the observation matrix that worsens the performance of the LASSO estimator in the training set. This attack problem can be formulated as
where B(Â, ∆) = {A | ||A −Â|| 2 F ≤ ∆} and the matrix A ∈ R m×n . We set m = 100, n = 500, ξ = 1 and ∆ = 10 −1 . In our experiments, first we generate a "ground-truth" vector x * with sparsity level s = 25 in which the location of the non-zero elements are chosen randomly and their values are sampled from a standard Gaussian distribution. Then, we generate the elements of matrix A using standard Gaussian distribution. Finally, we set b = Ax * + e, where e ∼ N (0, 0.001I). We compare the performance of the proposed algorithm with the popular subgradient descent-ascent and proximal gradient descent-ascent algorithms. In the subgradient descent-ascent algorithm, at each iteration, we take one step of sub-gradient ascent step with respect to x followed by one steps of sub-gradient ascent in A. Similarly, each iteration of the proximal gradient descent-ascent algorithm consists of one step of proximal gradient descent with respect to x and one step of proximal gradient descent with respect to A.
To have a fair comparison, all of the studied algorithms have been initialized at the same random points in Fig. 1 . 
The list of the algorithms used in the comparison is as follows: Proposed Algorithm (PA), Subgradient Descent-Ascent (SDA), and Proximal Descent-Ascent algorithm (PDA).
The above figure might not be a fair comparison since each step of the proposed algorithm is computationally more expensive than the two benchmark methods. To have a better comparison, we evaluate the performance of the algorithms in terms of the required time for convergence. Table 1 summarizes the average time required for different algorithms for finding a point (Ā,x) satisfying X (Ā,x) ≤ 0.1 and Y(Ā,x) ≤ 0.1. The average is taken over 100 different experiments. As can be seen in the table, the proposed method in average converges an order of magnitude faster than the other two algorithms. 
Discussions on Remark 1: Consider the optimization problem
in which the set Z is bounded and convex; and F (·) : R n → R is -smooth, i.e.,
One of the commonly used definitions of -stationary point for the optimization problem (6) is as follows.
Definition 4 ( -stationary point of the first type). A pointz is said to be an -stationary point of the first type of (6) if
where P Z (·) represents the projection operator to the feasible set Z.
Another notion of stationarity, which is used in this paper (as well as other works including [37] ), is defined as follows.
Definition 5 ( -stationary point of the second type). A pointz is said to be an -stationary point of the second type for the optimization problem (6) if
where
The following theorem shows that the stationarity definition in (8) is strictly stronger than the stationarity definition in (7) .
Theorem 4. The -stationary concept of the second type is stronger than the -stationary concept of the first type. In particular, if a pointz satisfies (8) , then it must also satisfy (7) . Moreover, there exist an optimization problem with a given feasible pointz such thatz is -stationary point of the first type, but it is not -stationary point of the second type for any < √ 2 + 2 .
Proof. We first show that (8) implies (7), i.e., if D(z) ≤ 2 then P Z (z + (1/ )∇F (z)) ≤ / . From definition of D(z), we have
On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 2 , the direct application of cosine equality implies that
where γ is the angle between the two vectorsz − P Z (ẑ) andẑ − P Z (ẑ). Moreover, from [38, Lemma 3.1] we know that cos γ ≤ 0. As a result, where the last equality is due to (9) . Furthermore, sincez is an -stationery point, i.e., D(z) ≤ 2 , we conclude that P Z (ẑ) −z ≤ / . In other words,z is an -stationary point of the first type.
Figure 2: Relation between different notions of stationarity
Next we show that the stationarity concept in (8) is strictly stronger than the stationarity concept in (7) . To understand this, let us take an additional look at Fig. 2 and equation (10) used in the proof above. Clearly, the two stationarity measures could coincide when cos γ = 0. Moreover, the two notions have the largest gap when cos γ = −1. Fig. 3 shows both of these scenarios. According to Fig. 3 , in order to create an example with largest gap between the two stationarity notions, we need to construct an example with the smallest possible value of cos γ. In particular, consider the optimization problem
It is easy to check that the pointz = 1 + is an -stationary point of the first type, while it is not an -stationary point of the second type for any < √ 2 + 2 .
Next, we re-state the lemmas used in the main body of the paper and present detailed proof of them.
Lemma 1. Let g(θ) = max
α∈A h(θ, α) − p(α) in which the function h(θ, α) is σ-strongly concave in α for any given θ. Then, under Assumption 3, the function g(θ) is differentiable. Moreover, its gradient is L g -Lipschitz continuous, i.e.,
Proof. The differentiability of the function g(θ) is obvious from Danskin's Theorem 1. In order to find the gradient's Lipschitz constant, define l(θ, α) = −h(θ, α) + p(α). Let α * 1 = arg min α∈A l(θ 1 , α) and α * 2 = arg min α∈A l(θ 2 , α).
Due to σ-strong convexity of l(θ, α) in α for any given θ, we have
Furthermore, due to optimality of α * 2 , l (θ 2 , α * 2 ; α * 1 − α * 2 ) ≥ 0. As a result, by adding the above two
On the other hand, from optimality of α * 1 , we have
Now, by adding (11) and (12) we get
where the last inequality holds by Cauchy-Schwartz and the Lipschitzness from Assumption 3. As a result, we get
Now, Theorem 1 implies that
where the last inequality is due to (13) .
Lemma 2.
(Rephrased from [39, 36] ) Assume F (x) = m(x)+n(x), where m(x) is σ-strongly convex and L-smooth, n(x) is convex and possibly non-smooth (and possibly extended real-valued). Then, by applying accelerated proximal gradient descent algorithm with restart parameter N 8L/σ − 1 for K iterations, with K being a constant multiple of N , we get
where x K is the iterate obtained at iteration K and x * arg min x F (x).
Lemma 3.
Let α t+1 to be the output of the accelerated proximal gradient descent in Algorithm 1
Then for any prescribed ∈ (0, 1), choose K large enough such that
Proof. From Lemma 2 we have,
Let α * (θ t ) arg max α∈A h(θ t , α) − p(α). By combining (15) and strong concavity of h(θ t , α) − p(α)
in α, we get
Combining this inequality with Assumption 3 implies that
where the last inequality comes from our choice of K.
Next, let us prove the second part of the lemma. First notice that by some algebraic manipulations, we can write
.
As a result,
where the last inequality follows from the choice of K. 
where C = max 2 log 2 + log (L g L 12 R), log L 22 + log (2L 22 R + g max + L p + R) and κ = L 22 σ , then there exists an iteration t ∈ {0, · · · , T } such that (θ t , α t+1 ) is an -FNE of (2).
Proof. First, by descent lemma we have
where the last equality follows the definition of θ t+1 . Thus we get,
where 1 is due to [37, Lemma 1] . Now if we choose
we have
due to Lemma 2. Combining this inequality with (16) and summing up both sides of the inequality (16) , we obtain
As a result, by picking T ≥ 4LgD 2 , at least for one of the iterates t ∈ {1, · · · , T } we have X (θ t , α k (θ t )) ≤ 2 . On the other hand, for that point t from Lemma 3, if we choose
This completes the proof. 
and L g λ = L 11 + 
Proof. We only need to show that when the regularized function converges to -FNE, by proper choice of λ, the converged point is also an -FNE of the original game.
It is important to notice that in the regularized function the smooth term is h λ (θ, α) = h(θ, α) − λ 2 α −α 2 . As a result, from Assumption 3 we have
where the last inequality is obtained by combing triangular inequality and Lipshitz smoothness of the function h(., .). Additionally, For simplicity, let X 0 (·, ·) and Y 0 (·, ·) represent the above definitions for the original function. In the following we show that by proper choice of λ the proposed algorithm will result in a point that X 0 (·, ·) ≤ 2 and Y 0 (·, ·) ≤ 2 . To show this, we first bound the Y 0 (·, ·) by Y λ (·, ·):
where 1 is based on [37, Lemma 1]. Hence,
where 1 is based on [37, Lemma 1] and the last inequality follows the definition and optimizing the quadratic term. As a result, by choosing λ ≤ min{L 22 
where the last inequality comes from the fact that by running Algorithm 1 with the given inputs, the regularized function has resulted in a 2 -FNE point. Now, since X (θ t , α t+1 ) is same for both original and regularized function, by picking T ≥ N T ( )
, we conclude X 0 (θ t , α t+1 ) ≤ 2 . This completes the proof.
